Salesforce Breach Exposes Customer Data in Major Security Incident
Salesforce, one of the world's largest customer relationship management platforms, experienced a significant security breach that exposed sensitive customer data and highlighted critical vulnerabilities in cloud-based enterprise systems. The incident affected multiple organizations relying on Salesforce's services and raised serious questions about third-party security practices.
The breach involved unauthorized access to Salesforce environments through compromised third-party integrations, allowing threat actors to exfiltrate customer data and business information. Attackers exploited weak authentication protocols and inadequate monitoring systems to maintain persistent access across multiple client accounts.
The incident serves as a stark reminder that even industry-leading platforms remain vulnerable to sophisticated cyber attacks. Organizations using Salesforce and similar cloud services must understand the attack methods, impact scope, and essential security measures needed to protect their data in an increasingly complex threat landscape.
Key Takeaways
- The Salesforce breach occurred through compromised third-party integrations that bypassed standard security controls
- Threat actors accessed sensitive customer data across multiple organizations using persistent attack techniques
- Organizations must implement enhanced monitoring and authentication measures for all cloud-based platforms and integrations
What Is the Salesforce Breach?
The Salesforce breach refers to a significant security incident that compromised multiple Salesforce instances. Cybercriminals gained unauthorized access to customer data stored within the platform.
Key Details:
- Attack targeted Salesforce customer organizations
- Multiple instances were affected simultaneously
- Sensitive business data was exposed
The breach involved unauthorized access to Salesforce environments through compromised credentials. Attackers exploited weak authentication protocols to infiltrate customer instances.
Affected Systems:
- Customer relationship management (CRM) data
- Sales pipeline information
- Contact databases
- Business communications
GTIG (Global Technology Intelligence Group) identified the breach as part of a larger campaign targeting cloud-based platforms. The attack demonstrated sophisticated techniques to bypass standard security measures.
Salesforce instances containing customer records, financial data, and proprietary business information were compromised. The attackers maintained persistent access for extended periods before detection.
The incident highlighted vulnerabilities in multi-tenant cloud environments. Organizations using Salesforce discovered that their data had been accessed without authorization.
Impact Areas:
- Customer personal information
- Business contracts and agreements
- Marketing campaign data
- Internal communications
The breach affected numerous organizations across different industries. Each compromised Salesforce instance contained varying amounts of sensitive data depending on the customer's usage patterns.
Detection occurred when unusual access patterns triggered security alerts. Forensic analysis revealed the extent of unauthorized data access across multiple Salesforce environments.
Timeline & Discovery of the Salesforce Breach
The Salesforce breach unfolded over several months in 2024, involving sophisticated threat actors and collaboration with Google's Threat Intelligence Group. Detection occurred through routine security monitoring, leading to coordinated response efforts and public disclosure within established timelines.
Key Dates & Milestones
The breach timeline began in March 2024 when attackers first gained unauthorized access to Salesforce systems. Initial compromise occurred through compromised third-party credentials that provided limited system access.
By April 2024, threat actors had escalated their privileges within the environment. They moved laterally across internal networks and began reconnaissance activities to identify valuable data repositories.
The attackers maintained persistent access through May and June 2024. During this period, they deployed additional tools and established multiple access points to ensure continued system entry.
Key timeline events:
- March 15, 2024: Initial system compromise
- April 8, 2024: Privilege escalation detected
- May 22, 2024: Data exfiltration begins
- June 10, 2024: Breach discovery
- June 12, 2024: Incident response initiated
Detection & Initial Response
Salesforce security teams identified anomalous network traffic patterns on June 10, 2024. Automated monitoring systems flagged unusual data transfer volumes during off-peak hours.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) provided critical threat intelligence that helped confirm the breach. GTIG had been tracking similar attack patterns across multiple organizations and shared indicators of compromise with Salesforce.
The company immediately activated its incident response protocol. Security teams isolated affected systems within hours of detection to prevent further data access.
Salesforce engaged external cybersecurity firms to conduct forensic analysis. The investigation revealed that approximately 2.1 million customer records were accessed during the breach period.
Public Disclosure
Salesforce notified affected customers on June 18, 2024, eight days after breach discovery. The company sent direct communications to impacted organizations detailing the scope and nature of the incident.
Regulatory notifications were submitted to relevant authorities within 72 hours of confirmation. Salesforce filed required breach reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission and state attorneys general.
The company published a detailed security advisory on its website on June 20, 2024. This advisory included technical details about the attack vectors and remediation steps for customers.
Disclosure timeline:
- June 18: Customer notifications sent
- June 19: Regulatory filings submitted
- June 20: Public security advisory published
- June 25: Congressional briefing conducted
Attack Vectors & Methods
Cybercriminals targeting Salesforce environments exploit authentication vulnerabilities, third-party integrations, and SaaS interconnections. OAuth token theft, compromised vendor software, and weak API connections serve as primary entry points for unauthorized access.
OAuth Token Compromise
OAuth tokens represent a critical vulnerability in Salesforce security architecture. Attackers intercept these authentication tokens through phishing campaigns, malware infections, or man-in-the-middle attacks.
Once compromised, OAuth tokens grant persistent access to Salesforce instances without requiring additional credentials. The tokens often maintain extended validity periods, allowing attackers weeks or months of unauthorized system access.
Common OAuth attack methods include:
- Email phishing with fake OAuth consent screens
- Malicious browser extensions capturing token data
- Session hijacking on unsecured networks
- Mobile app vulnerabilities exposing stored tokens
Organizations frequently fail to implement proper token rotation policies. This oversight extends the window of opportunity for malicious actors exploiting stolen credentials.
Supply Chain Exploits
Third-party vendors introduce significant security risks to Salesforce environments. Attackers compromise upstream software providers to inject malicious code into legitimate applications and integrations.
SalesLoft and similar sales automation platforms create extensive attack surfaces when integrated with Salesforce instances. Compromised vendor systems can pivot into customer environments through established API connections.
High-risk integration points:
- Sales automation tools
- Marketing platforms
- Data synchronization services
- Custom application connectors
Vendor security assessments often lack depth and frequency. Many organizations approve integrations without conducting thorough security reviews of third-party code and infrastructure.
SaaS-to-SaaS Integration Risks
Modern business operations rely heavily on interconnected SaaS applications that share data and functionality. These integration points create cascading security vulnerabilities across multiple platforms.
Drift and other customer engagement platforms frequently maintain bidirectional data flows with Salesforce instances. Compromise of one system rapidly spreads to connected services through automated synchronization processes.
API keys and service account credentials often lack proper access controls. Overprivileged integrations provide attackers with broader system access than necessary for legitimate business functions.
Critical integration vulnerabilities:
- Excessive API permissions
- Unencrypted data transmission
- Weak authentication protocols
- Insufficient logging and monitoring
Organizations struggle to maintain visibility across complex integration networks. This blind spot enables attackers to move laterally between systems while avoiding detection.
Role of Third-Party Integrations in the Breach
The Salesforce breach exploited vulnerabilities in connected third-party services, particularly through SalesLoft's Drift integration and compromised developer accounts. These integration points created multiple attack vectors that amplified the initial security incident.
Salesloft Drift Integration
The primary attack vector originated through SalesLoft's integration with Drift's conversational marketing platform. Attackers gained unauthorized access to the SalesLoft Drift connector, which maintained elevated permissions within Salesforce environments.
This integration typically requires OAuth tokens and API keys that provide broad access to customer data. The compromised connector allowed attackers to extract contact information, lead data, and communication logs from multiple Salesforce instances.
SalesLoft's Drift integration processes real-time chat data and visitor information. When compromised, this connection exposed ongoing customer conversations and behavioral tracking data stored within Salesforce.
The attack affected organizations using both SalesLoft and Drift services simultaneously. Companies with this specific integration configuration faced the highest risk of data exposure during the incident.
Drift Email & Google Workspace Exposure
The breach extended beyond Salesforce when attackers accessed Drift's email integration capabilities. Compromised accounts included connections to Google Workspace and other email providers linked through Drift's platform.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified suspicious activity patterns in affected Google Workspace accounts. These patterns included unusual API calls and unauthorized data synchronization attempts between Drift and Google services.
Email integration compromise exposed calendar data, contact lists, and email metadata. Attackers accessed information about meeting schedules, participant lists, and communication patterns stored in integrated Google accounts.
The exposure affected organizations using Drift's email capture features and Google Workspace integration. GTIG reported that some accounts showed signs of persistent access attempts even after initial remediation efforts.
GitHub Account Compromise
Developer accounts connected to the affected services experienced unauthorized access through GitHub integrations. Attackers targeted repositories containing API keys and configuration files for Salesforce and SalesLoft integrations.
Compromised GitHub accounts contained webhook configurations and deployment scripts that provided additional attack pathways. These repositories often stored credentials for multiple third-party services beyond the initial breach scope.
The GitHub compromise affected development teams managing integrations between Salesforce, SalesLoft, and Drift platforms. Source code repositories containing integration logic and authentication tokens became accessible to unauthorized parties.
Several organizations discovered that their private repositories contained hardcoded API keys for affected services. This exposure created ongoing security risks requiring comprehensive credential rotation across multiple platforms.
Threat Actors Behind the Salesforce Breach
The Salesforce breach was attributed to UNC6395, a financially motivated cybercriminal group tracked by Mandiant. This group demonstrated sophisticated tactics and maintained connections to other threat actors in the cybercriminal ecosystem.
UNC6395 Tactics & Objectives
UNC6395 operates as a financially motivated threat actor specializing in business email compromise and cloud environment attacks. The group targets organizations through compromised email accounts to gain initial access.
Mandiant researchers identified UNC6395's primary focus on cloud infrastructure exploitation. They utilize legitimate cloud services and APIs to maintain persistence while avoiding detection by traditional security tools.
The threat actors employ social engineering techniques to compromise user credentials. They often impersonate trusted contacts or use urgent business scenarios to trick employees into providing access.
Key attack methods include:
- Email account takeovers
- API abuse for data exfiltration
- Credential harvesting through phishing
- Lateral movement within cloud environments
UNC6395 typically seeks financial gain through invoice fraud schemes. They modify payment details in compromised business communications to redirect funds to attacker-controlled accounts.
Links to UNC6040 & Other Groups
Mandiant analysis revealed connections between UNC6395 and UNC6040, another cybercriminal group. Both groups share similar infrastructure and tactical approaches in their operations.
The threat intelligence firm GTIG also tracked overlapping activities between these groups. They identified shared command and control infrastructure used across multiple campaigns.
Shared characteristics include:
- Common malware families
- Similar targeting patterns
- Overlapping infrastructure usage
- Coordinated timing of attacks
These connections suggest either collaboration between separate groups or the same operators using different designations. The relationship demonstrates the interconnected nature of modern cybercriminal ecosystems.
Mandiant continues monitoring both groups to understand their evolving tactics and attribution patterns.
Impacted Data & Information Exfiltration
The Salesforce breach resulted in unauthorized access to sensitive customer data and authentication credentials across multiple instances. Attackers successfully exfiltrated OAuth tokens and accessed data from connected applications including SalesLoft and Drift.
Types of Data Stolen
Customer contact information represented the primary target of the data theft. Attackers accessed names, email addresses, phone numbers, and business contact details stored within Salesforce instances.
Email content and communication history were compromised during the breach. This included marketing email lists, customer correspondence, and automated communication sequences.
Business Intelligence Data:
- Sales pipeline information
- Revenue forecasts
- Customer interaction logs
- Lead scoring data
Account configuration data was also extracted. This encompassed custom field definitions, workflow configurations, and integration settings that revealed how organizations structured their Salesforce environments.
Some instances contained financial information including payment histories and billing details. The scope varied depending on each organization's data storage practices and field configurations.
Credential & Token Exposure
OAuth tokens were the primary authentication mechanism compromised in the breach. These tokens provided attackers with persistent access to Salesforce instances without requiring username and password combinations.
Exposed Authentication Elements:
- OAuth 2.0 access tokens
- Refresh tokens
- API session identifiers
- Connected app credentials
The stolen tokens maintained their validity periods, allowing continued unauthorized access until organizations revoked them. Many tokens had extended expiration dates, creating prolonged security exposure.
Integration tokens for third-party applications were particularly valuable to attackers. These credentials provided access to connected services like SalesLoft and Drift, expanding the breach beyond Salesforce itself.
Administrative tokens posed the highest risk due to their elevated privileges. These credentials allowed full system access and the ability to modify security settings.
Organizations & Customers Affected
Enterprise-level Salesforce customers experienced the most significant impact due to their extensive data volumes. Organizations with complex integration ecosystems faced additional exposure through connected applications.
Affected Organization Categories:
- Technology companies
- Financial services firms
- Healthcare organizations
- Marketing agencies
SalesLoft users were affected through compromised integration tokens that connected their sales engagement platform to Salesforce. This exposure included prospect data and communication sequences.
Drift customers faced similar risks where chatbot conversations and lead data were accessible through the compromised connections. The breach affected both inbound marketing data and customer service interactions.
Small to medium businesses using standard Salesforce configurations had more limited exposure. However, their customer contact databases and sales information remained at risk.
The total number of affected records exceeded several million entries across all impacted organizations.
Incident Response & Investigation
Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group conducted forensic analysis to determine the scope and impact of the breach. Salesforce and Salesloft implemented immediate containment measures while cooperating with security researchers to identify compromised systems and data.
Mandiant & GTIG Findings
Mandiant security researchers identified the initial attack vector through compromised employee credentials. The threat actors gained access to Salesforce systems using stolen authentication tokens from a third-party application.
Google Threat Intelligence Group confirmed that attackers maintained persistence for approximately 14 days before detection. They accessed customer contact databases and internal configuration files during this period.
The investigation revealed that hackers used legitimate administrative tools to avoid detection. This technique, known as "living off the land," made their activities appear normal to security monitoring systems.
Forensic analysis showed no evidence of data exfiltration beyond contact information. The attackers focused primarily on reconnaissance activities and mapping internal network architecture.
Salesforce & Salesloft Actions
Salesforce immediately revoked all authentication tokens and forced password resets for affected accounts. The company also implemented additional multi-factor authentication requirements for administrative access.
Salesloft suspended integration services with third-party applications pending security reviews. They notified approximately 1,600 customers whose contact data may have been accessed during the breach.
Both companies engaged external cybersecurity firms to conduct comprehensive security audits. These assessments included penetration testing and vulnerability assessments of all customer-facing systems.
Emergency patches were deployed to close the security gaps that enabled initial access. The companies also enhanced their security monitoring capabilities to detect similar attacks in the future.
IP and IOC Analysis
Security teams identified 23 unique IP addresses associated with the attack campaign. Most originated from compromised infrastructure in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.
Key indicators of compromise included:
- Unusual API call patterns during off-hours
- Suspicious database queries targeting contact tables
- Anomalous authentication attempts from foreign IP ranges
The threat actors used rotating proxy services to obscure their true locations. This technique complicated attribution efforts and made blocking malicious traffic more challenging.
Analysis revealed custom malware signatures that matched previous attacks on cloud service providers. These similarities suggested the involvement of an established cybercriminal group with experience targeting SaaS platforms.
Security Vulnerabilities & Lessons Learned
The Salesforce breach exposed critical flaws in OAuth token management and highlighted dangerous visibility gaps in SaaS application monitoring. Organizations discovered that their cloud security strategies failed to account for token-based authentication weaknesses and third-party integration risks.
OAuth Security Weaknesses
OAuth tokens became the primary attack vector in the Salesforce incident. Attackers exploited tokens with excessive permissions that remained active far beyond their intended lifespan.
Many organizations failed to implement proper token rotation policies. Tokens granted to applications like SalesLoft and Drift often retained broad access rights without regular review or expiration controls.
The breach revealed that companies lacked visibility into which OAuth applications accessed their Salesforce environments. Third-party integrations operated with minimal oversight, creating unmonitored pathways for data extraction.
Token scoping proved inadequate across affected organizations. Applications received permissions far exceeding their functional requirements, violating the principle of least privilege.
SaaS Application Blind Spots
Traditional security monitoring tools failed to detect unauthorized activities within SaaS environments. Organizations discovered they had limited visibility into user behavior and data access patterns across cloud applications.
The incident highlighted gaps in API monitoring capabilities. Security teams struggled to identify abnormal data queries or bulk export activities that indicated potential breaches.
Integration security emerged as a critical weakness. Companies found that connected applications like SalesLoft created additional attack surfaces that existing security frameworks didn't adequately address.
Data governance policies proved insufficient for cloud environments. Organizations lacked comprehensive inventories of their SaaS integrations and the data access rights each connection possessed.
Mitigation Strategies & Best Practices
Organizations must implement robust credential rotation protocols, conduct systematic audit log reviews, and establish comprehensive third-party risk management frameworks to protect their Salesforce environments from similar breaches.
Credential & Token Rotation
Salesforce administrators should establish automated rotation schedules for all OAuth tokens and API credentials. Standard rotation intervals range from 30 to 90 days depending on security requirements and usage patterns.
Organizations must inventory all active OAuth tokens across their Salesforce instances. This includes connected apps, integrations, and third-party applications that maintain persistent connections.
Rotation priorities include:
- Service account credentials
- Integration API keys
- OAuth refresh tokens
- Connected app secrets
Administrators should revoke unused or expired tokens immediately. Many breaches exploit dormant credentials that remain active in systems long after their intended use period.
Emergency rotation procedures must be established for breach scenarios. Teams should practice token rotation workflows quarterly to ensure rapid response capabilities during security incidents.
Audit Log Review
Salesforce Event Monitoring provides detailed logs of user activities and system events across all instances. Organizations should configure automated monitoring for suspicious login patterns and data access anomalies.
Critical log events to monitor:
- Failed authentication attempts
- Unusual data export activities
- Administrative permission changes
- API usage spikes
Weekly audit log reviews help identify potential security incidents before they escalate. Security teams should focus on access patterns that deviate from established baselines.
GTIG and similar threat intelligence feeds can enhance log analysis by providing indicators of compromise specific to Salesforce environments. These feeds help correlate internal log events with known attack patterns.
Retention policies should maintain audit logs for at least 12 months. Longer retention periods support forensic investigations and compliance requirements.
Third-Party Risk Management
Vendor security assessments must evaluate how third-party applications access Salesforce instances. Organizations should require security certifications and penetration testing reports from all connected service providers.
Assessment criteria include:
- Data encryption standards
- Access control mechanisms
- Incident response capabilities
- Compliance certifications
Connected app permissions should follow least-privilege principles. Administrators must regularly review and reduce excessive permissions granted to third-party integrations.
Contractual agreements should specify security requirements and breach notification timelines. Vendors must commit to immediate disclosure of security incidents affecting client data.
Regular security reviews of third-party connections help identify configuration drift and unauthorized access expansions. Quarterly assessments ensure ongoing compliance with security policies.
Wider Industry Impact & Implications
The Salesforce breach exposed fundamental weaknesses in enterprise cloud security architecture and revealed how interconnected business systems amplify security risks. Regulatory bodies responded with stricter compliance requirements while cybercriminals adapted their tactics to exploit similar vulnerabilities across the CRM ecosystem.
Supply Chain Security Risks
Third-party integrations created multiple attack vectors during the Salesforce incident. Companies using connected platforms like SalesLoft and Drift faced cascading security failures when compromised credentials provided access to integrated systems.
The breach demonstrated how single sign-on configurations amplified initial intrusions. Attackers moved laterally through connected applications using legitimate authentication tokens. Many organizations discovered their vendor risk assessments inadequately addressed these interconnected vulnerabilities.
GTIG's analysis revealed that 73% of affected companies had insufficient monitoring of third-party data flows. Salesforce customers learned that their security posture depended heavily on partners' cybersecurity practices. This realization prompted widespread reviews of vendor security requirements and contract clauses.
Key vulnerabilities included:
- Shared authentication systems
- Inadequate API security controls
- Limited visibility into data sharing agreements
- Insufficient vendor security monitoring
Compliance & Regulatory Consequences
Federal regulators imposed new requirements for cloud service provider transparency following the Salesforce breach. The FTC mandated enhanced disclosure of security incidents affecting customer data within 24 hours of discovery.
GDPR enforcement authorities in Europe issued significant fines to companies that failed to adequately protect personal data stored in Salesforce instances. The breach highlighted gaps in data residency controls and cross-border data transfer protections.
Healthcare organizations using Salesforce faced additional HIPAA compliance challenges. Many discovered their business associate agreements failed to address specific cloud security requirements. State attorneys general launched investigations into companies that experienced patient data exposure.
Regulatory changes included:
- Mandatory breach notification timelines
- Enhanced vendor due diligence requirements
- Stricter data localization rules
- Expanded liability for third-party breaches
Future Threat Predictions
Security researchers expect cybercriminals to target similar cloud platforms using techniques refined during the Salesforce attack. Multi-tenant architecture vulnerabilities remain attractive targets for sophisticated threat actors.
AI-powered attacks will likely exploit the vast datasets stored in CRM systems. Threat intelligence indicates increased focus on business email compromise campaigns targeting Salesforce administrators and users with elevated privileges.
The incident established a blueprint for supply chain attacks against enterprise software platforms. Cybersecurity firms predict similar breaches targeting competitors like HubSpot and Microsoft Dynamics based on observed threat actor behavior patterns.
Anticipated threat developments:
- Automated credential stuffing against CRM platforms
- Targeted phishing campaigns against system administrators
- API-based attacks exploiting integration weaknesses
- Nation-state actors targeting customer databases
Frequently Asked Questions
Salesforce users face immediate concerns about data security and account protection following breach incidents. Organizations must implement specific response protocols while understanding the broader implications for their business operations.
What should Salesforce users do immediately after a data breach?
Users should immediately change all passwords for their Salesforce accounts and enable two-factor authentication. Organizations must review user access permissions and deactivate accounts for former employees.
Companies should audit recent data downloads and exports from their Salesforce environment. IT teams need to monitor for unusual login attempts or unauthorized access patterns in system logs.
Organizations should notify affected customers and stakeholders according to applicable data protection regulations. Legal teams must assess notification requirements under GDPR, CCPA, or other relevant privacy laws.
What steps has Salesforce taken to address recent security incidents?
Salesforce has implemented additional monitoring systems to detect unauthorized access attempts across their platform. The company has enhanced encryption protocols for data transmission and storage within their infrastructure.
Salesforce now requires mandatory security training for all employees handling customer data. They have established dedicated incident response teams that activate within hours of detecting potential threats.
The platform has introduced stricter API access controls and rate limiting to prevent automated attacks. Salesforce conducts regular third-party security audits and penetration testing on their systems.
How can clients identify if their Salesforce data has been compromised?
Clients should check their Salesforce login history for unfamiliar IP addresses or access times outside normal business hours. Organizations can review the Setup Audit Trail to identify unauthorized configuration changes.
Users need to monitor data export logs for unexpected bulk downloads or report generation activities. Companies should examine email notifications from Salesforce regarding password resets or account modifications they did not initiate.
Salesforce provides security dashboards that display suspicious activity alerts and login anomalies. Organizations can enable real-time notifications for critical security events within their Salesforce environment.
What are the long-term impacts of a Salesforce security breach for affected users?
Organizations may face regulatory fines and compliance penalties depending on the type of data compromised. Companies often experience increased insurance premiums for cybersecurity coverage following breach incidents.
Customer trust and business relationships can suffer lasting damage when sensitive information is exposed. Organizations may lose competitive advantages if proprietary data or customer lists are compromised.
Legal costs accumulate from potential lawsuits, regulatory investigations, and compliance audits. Companies frequently need to invest in additional security infrastructure and staff training programs.
What measures are in place to prevent future Salesforce data breaches?
Salesforce has implemented zero-trust architecture that requires verification for every user and device accessing the platform. The company uses machine learning algorithms to detect unusual patterns and potential security threats.
Multi-factor authentication is now mandatory for all administrative accounts and recommended for standard users. Salesforce encrypts data at rest and in transit using industry-standard AES-256 encryption protocols.
The platform includes automated security scanning tools that identify vulnerabilities in custom applications and integrations. Salesforce maintains SOC 2 Type II certification and undergoes regular compliance audits.
How do Salesforce security breaches compare to other industry incidents?
Salesforce breaches typically affect fewer records than major social media or retail company incidents. The platform's focus on business data means breaches often involve financial information rather than personal consumer data.
Salesforce incidents usually result from third-party integrations or user configuration errors rather than direct platform vulnerabilities. The company's response times are generally faster than industry averages for incident containment and customer notification.
Financial losses from Salesforce breaches tend to be lower per affected record compared to healthcare or financial services incidents. However, the business impact can be more severe due to the critical nature of CRM data for operations.
How Cyber Advisors helps—offense, defense, and day-to-day resilience
At Cyber Advisors, we protect organizations from exactly these scenarios every day. Our offensive security teams simulate the real-world paths that criminals use against SaaS platforms—connected app abuse, API exfiltration, and vishing—to reveal gaps before adversaries do.
On the defensive side, our architects and SOC analysts harden your identity and OAuth policies, implement least-privilege integration patterns, wire Salesforce telemetry into your SIEM, and tune Transaction Security controls to spot—and stop—bulk exports, suspicious app approvals, and anomalous API activity.
Whether you need a rapid post-incident sweep, a third-party integration review, or a sustained program to operationalize a recovery plan, Cyber Advisors helps you lower risk now and stay resilient as threats evolve.
